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The plaintiff/appellant, Joanna Banford, pursuant to 
Rule 24 (b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
submits the following Appellant's Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (k) . This is a final 
appeal from an Order of the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Davis County, Utah the Honorable Rodney Page 
presiding. That final judgment dismissed with prejudice the 
personal injury claim of Joanna Banford. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Banford fully comply with the notice of claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by serving 
the Notice of Claim upon Kaysville's City Finance Director? 
2. Was the complaint filed timely as required by the 
Governmental Immunity Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal involve legal conclusions by the 
trial court. Those legal conclusions will be given no 
deference by this Court and will be reviewed for legal 
correctness. T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretations of the following statutory 
provisions are determinative of the issues on appeal. The 
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language of these designated statutes are set out in the 
Addendum to this Appellant's Brief, pursuant to Rule 24 (f) 
(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-7 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104 
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This is a personal injury claim, alleging that the City 
of Kaysville is negligent through the doctrine of Respondeat 
Superior, and that such negligence was the proximate cause 
of Joanna Banford's and her daughter Amber's injuries, 
sustained in an automobile collision with David Quinley, a 
Kaysville City Police Officer, on February 18, 1995. 
B- Course of Proceedings 
The complaint was filed in the Second Judicial District 
Court on February 18, 1997. On June 19, 1997, Defendants 
Kaysville City Corp., David Quinley and Kaysville City 
Police Department, moved the court to dismiss the action for 
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 
(1953), as amended. The court in its ruling on December 17, 
1997 dismissed the appellant's complaint for failing to 
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comply with Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et. seq. (1953), as 
amended. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
Honorable Rodney Page, Second District Court Judge, 
granted defendant/appellees Motion to Dismiss on December 
17, 1997. 
D• Statement of Facts 
1. Joanna Banford was the driver of a vehicle 
involved in an accident on February 18, 1995 in Davis County 
with her daughter, Amber Banford, as a passenger. (R. 31-82 
Pg. 1 1 1) 
2. The second vehicle in the collision was driven by 
David Quinley, a Kaysville City Police Officer, who was on 
duty at the time of the collision. Officer David Quinley 
ran a stop sign and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle. 
(R. 31-82 Pg. 1-2 f2) 
3. The Banford's retained Kenneth L. Sondgeroth, attorney 
at law of Bullhead City, Arizona in late April/May 1995. (R. 
31-82 Pg. 2 f 3) 
4. In early April 1995, Brian Jensen, a long time 
companion of Joanna Banford, attempted to assist in getting 
Ms. Banford's medical bills paid that were in excess of her 
own no-fault benefits. Through phone calls, Mr. Jensen 
spoke to Art Johnson, the mayor of Kaysville City, David 
Helquist, the Chief of Police of Kaysville City and finally 
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Dean Storey, Kaysville City Finance Director. Mr. Storey 
instructed Mr. Jensen to contact Reliance Insurance and 
shortly thereafter Clay Stephens, the adjuster for Reliance 
Insurance, contacted Ms. Banford by telephone. At the time 
of the conversations with Mr. Stephens, the Banfords did not 
have legal counsel. (R. 31-82, pg. 2 ^4) 
5. Clay Stephens kept in contact for some time after 
this initial conversation with Joanna Banford and told her 
to not worry about the bills and to concentrate on her 
medical recovery from the injuries sustained in the 
accident. He indicated to her that "their client was at 
fault" and that the matter could be settled. (R. 31-82, Pg. 
2 115) 
6. Clay Stephens continued to contact Joanna Banford 
in an attempt to settle these matters despite being told 
plaintiff had retained counsel and, at one point, Clay 
Stephens stated there was no need for attorneys as this case 
could have been settled without attorneys getting involved. 
(R.31-82, Pg. 2 H 6) 
7. In subsequent telephone conversations with Joanna 
Banford, Mr. Stephens attempted to settle the case of Amber 
Banford and offered the sum of $12,000.00, less $3,000.00 
no-fault medical benefits with the Banford1s being 
responsible for all other outstanding medical bills and any 
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remaining funds would be put in a court approved trust 
account for the benefit of Amber. (R. 31-82, Pg. 2 ^6) 
8. On July 12, 1995, plaintiff by and through her 
attorney Kenneth L. Sondgeroth, sent a letter to "Kaysville 
City Corporation re: personal injury of Joanna Banford and 
Amber Banford; Date of accident: 2/18/95." This letter was 
directed to "To whom it may concern: We represent Joanna 
Banford and Amber Banford in their claim for personal 
injuries sustained in the automobile collision of February 
18, 1995. David J. Qumley was driving a vehicle which you 
owned that was involved in the accident." The letter 
further went on to request the name of Kaysville City's 
insurance carrier and to notify their insurance carrier of 
the accident. (R. 31-82, Pg. 3 fl 7) 
9. Pursuant to this letter of July 12, 1995, Dean G. 
Storey, Finance Director of Kaysville City, responded on 
July 25, 1995. The letter gave Mr. Sondgeroth the name and 
address of Kaysville City's insurance carrier, Reliance 
Insurance Company, the city attorney, and the irsurance 
agent for Kaysville City. This letter closed with the line, 
"Please contact me as the city representative." (R. 31-82, 
Pg. 3 U8) 
10. On November 16, 1995 Kenneth L. Sondgeroth wrote 
directly to Dean Storey, Kaysville City finance director. 
The main thrust of this letter was the contacts as outlined 
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above with Clay Stephens, the adjuster for Reliance. Also 
in this letter, Mr. Sondgeroth stated: 
"As you are aware, my office represents both Joanna and 
Amber Banford in their claims that arose from a vehicle 
accident with a member of your police force. Clearly, 
as is evident from the police report, the police 
officer was grossly negligent and that my clients were 
nothing but innocent victims... Joanna Banford 
underwent radical surgery which, while relatively 
successful, still leaves her quite permanently 
disabled." 
Mr. Sondgeroth!s letter further went on: 
"Mrs. Banford has incurred significant medical bills as 
a result of this accident. Some of the bills were paid 
by her own auto coverage, but significant portions were 
not . . . Mrs. Banford's injuries for her shattered 
knee are in excess of $750,000.00. 
Amber Banford was the minor who sustained head injuries 
in this accident. She continues to suffer from 
dizziness and other symptoms of head trauma. Mr. 
Stephens has already made an offer on her damages 
without knowing the full extent of damages she has 
incurred. 
I know that the mayor of your city has spoken to my 
clients. He appeared concerned that they be treated 
well . . . I believe that your city has some influence 
on Reliance Insurance with respect to the party 
negotiating on your behalf." (R. 31-82, Pg. 3-4 ^9) 
11. On February 28, 1996, Letisa McKenzie sent a 
letter to Mr. Sondgeroth stating: 
"Please be advised that I have taken over the handling 
of the above captioned matter. At your earliest 
convenience I request that you forward copies of your 
clients medical specials including bills and reports. 
If your clients are making claims for lost wages, I 
would also request that forwarding documentation as 
well. I look forward to working with you on this 
matter." See attached exhibit 7. (Emphasis added) 
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A similar follow-up letter was sent to Mr. Sondgeroth 
from Ms. McKenzie on April 2, 1996. (R. 31-82, Pg. 4 f10) 
12. During this time period plaintiffs continued to 
receive medical care and treatment. The final reports were 
obtained from treating physicians and complete settlement 
brochures on the plaintiffs were prepared and submitted to 
Reliance Insurance in January, 1997. (R. 31-82, Pg. 4-5 [^11) 
13. The complaint in this case was filed February 18, 
1997. (R. 31-82, Pg. 5 f 13) 
14. By way of letter of April 30, 1997, Reliance 
Insurance, by and through Letisa McKenzie, denied any and 
all claims of the plaintiff due to the failure to give 
notice as required under Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. 
That letter was followed by the defendants' motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, filed by the defendants on 
June 19, 1997. (R. 31-82, Pg. 5 f 14) 
15. In the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
the defendants claimed that the notice to the governmental 
entity had not been filed in a timely manner and, even if 
said notice was sufficient under the statute, the complaint 
against the governmental entity was not filed in a timely 
manner. (R. 14-30 Pg. 3-7) 
16. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition on 
July 18, 1997 (R. 31-82) with a reply being submitted by the 
defense on August 8, 1997. (R. 83-93) Oral argument was 
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then held and Judge Page wished for further clarification on 
conflicts between the three day mailing rule of URCP and one 
day notice of claim pursuant to UCA 63-37-1 (notice of claim 
deemed filed on same date it is mailed). The plaintiffs 
then filed a response memorandum to this October 17, 1997 
letter on October 22, 1997. (R. 99-116) 
17. On December 17, 1997 the trial court issued a 
ruling on defendants motion to dismiss. The trial court 
stated that the letter to Dean Storey, city finance director 
of Kaysville, "substantially complied with the notice 
requirements of section 63-30-11 of the Governmental 
Immunity Act." The trial court then went to the question on 
whether plaintiffs' complaint was filed in a timely manner. 
The trial court stated: 
"The Court, therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs' 
complaint was not filed within the one year period as 
required by the Governmental Immunity Act, that does 
not resolve the case. Plaintiffs have raised an issue 
of estoppel as a result of the alleged actions of the 
insurance carrier for the city, and the court concludes 
that there are questions of fact and issues raised on 
that issue which preclude the court from granting 
defendants' motion to dismiss at this time." (R. 117-
121) 
18. On January 14, 1998 a motion for reconsideration 
was filed by plaintiffs that included affidavits from 
attorney Sondgeroth and Jean Ascivedo, Mr. Sondgeroth's 
secretary, concerning actual dates that the letter of 
November 16, 1997 was mailed to the city of Kaysville. (R. 
141) 
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19. On January 27, 1998 defendants filed a motion to 
alter judgments or amend judgment and motion to strike 
affidavits of Sondgeroth and Ascivedo and accompanying 
memorandum. (R. 156-158) A reply was then filed February 9, 
1998 by plaintiffs. (R. 174-181) 
20. On April 24, 1998 the "Ruling on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling on Motion to Dismiss" 
was issued by the court relying on Larsen vs. Park City, 
decided March 27, 1998 by the Utah Supreme Court, 339 UAR 17 
published March 31, 1998. The trial court below stated that 
the Larsen case clarified the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Kaysville is a third class city and, under the statute, the 
city council of such a city must be given actual notice of 
the claim. To further clarify its ruling, this Court stated 
that, "no claim was filed with the governing body as 
required by statute and case law in the one year period and 
the claim is barred and the court was without jurisdiction." 
(R. 189-193) 
21. The court further went on to state that there 
were no grounds for plaintiffs' claim of equitable estoppel 
or waiver of the notice requirements and that the complaint 
was dismissed with prejudice. (R. 189-193) Findings and 
Judgment were submitted by the defendant to the court for 
signature. That Judgme nt was signed on May 26, 1998 and 
docketed on June 2, 1998. (R. 194-196) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Banfora has fully complied with the notice provisions 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The November 16, 
1995 letter satisfies those notice requirements. The facts 
of this case, as well as Utah Case law, support that the 
individuals served are appropriate parties to serve under 
the statute and represent those with authority to 
administer, control, direct, and manage the affairs of the 
City of Kaysville. All purposes of the notice provisions of 
the Act have been satisfied in this case. The Julyl2, 1995 
letter addressed to "Kaysville City Corporation", along with 
the notice of claim letter addressed to the Dean Storey, the 
Kaysville City Finance Director, allowed the appropriate 
governmental entities to investigate and evaluate the claim. 
The insurance adjuster for the city contacted the 
appellants, informal discovery had commenced, and settlement 
negotiations had begun. The trial court's order of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, subverted the purposes of the 
Act. 
Upon compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, appellants did file their 
complaint within the statutory one year period provided in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (2). In computing the time under 
the Act, Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-7 are the controlling authority. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BANFORD FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE 
OF CLAIM PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Before addressing the City's specific allegations of 
how Banford's notice of claim filing was defective, a review 
of the purpose of the notice requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act ("Act") is important. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Gallegos v. Midvale, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), 
the notice requirements of the Act are designed "to alert the 
public authority so that a proper and timely investigation of 
the claim can be made." I_d. at 1337. The City cannot argue 
that purpose was not accomplished in this case. In April 
1995, Brian Jensen, a long time companion of Joanna Banford, 
attempted to assist Joanna in getting all of her bills paid 
that were above and beyond her own no-fault benefits. In 
doing so, Mr. Jensen made phone calls to the mayor of 
Kaysville, the Chief of Police and the City Finance Director. 
Shortly thereafter, Dean G. Storey, the City Finance Director 
contacted Mr. Jensen and instructed him to call Clay 
Stephens, the city insurance carrier's adjuster. Clay 
Stephens ended up contacting Mr. Jensen and indicated that 
"their client was at fault," and that the matter could be 
settled. On July 12, 1995, appellee, by and through her 
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attorney Kenneth L. Sondgeroth, sent a letter to "Kaysville 
City Corporation." This letter addressed to whom it may 
concern, identified appellees counsel and gave notice of the 
accident and injuries sustained as a result of that accident 
by Joanna and Amber Banford. Pursuant to that letter, Dean 
G. Storey, the Finance Director of Kaysville City, responded 
on July 25, 1995, divulging the name of the City's insurance 
carrier, the city attorney and the insurance agent. The 
responding letter closed with the line "Please contact me as 
the city representative." Clearly, the correspondence and 
the exchange of information including the July 12, 1995 
letter to "Kaysville City Corporation" and the response by 
the City Finance Director is evidence of the Notice of Claim 
and the investigation conducted by the City. In Scarborough 
v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), the 
Supreme Court stated that full compliance with the 
requirements of the notice of claim statute consists of: 
Prior to filing suite, a claim 
must be filed which (1) is in writing, 
(2) states the facts and the nature of 
the claim, (3) is signed by the 
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered 
to someone authorized to receive it, and 
(5) has been filed within the prescribed 
time. 
Banford fully complied with those provisions both in the July 
12, 1995 letter her then attorney Sondgeroth wrote to 
"Kaysville City Corporation", and in a November 16, 1995 
letter written directly to Dean Storey, as the "city 
12 
representative", which clearly outlined the Banford's claims 
against the city. Each of those documents was in writing. 
Each stated the facts and nature of the Banford's claims. 
The Banford's attorney signed both letters. Both documents 
were mailed and received by Mr. Storey, who had previously 
represented on numerous occasions to Joanna Banford and ner 
representatives that he was the "city's representative" and 
should be contacted as such. 
Joanna Banford has fully complied with the notice of 
claim requirements of the Act. The trial court was correct 
in its ruling on December 17, 1997 denying the City's Motion 
to Dismiss, stating that the letter to Dean Storey, city 
finance director of Kaysville, "substantially complied with 
the notice requirements of section 63-30-11 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act" . 
A. Banford Has Complied With The Act By 
Serving The Notice Of Claim Upon Dean 
Storey, City Finance Director. 
The City does not argue that Banford is guilty of no 
compliance with the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-13. The City argues defective compliance with 
the notice of claim requirements because the Notice of Claim 
was not filed with the "governing body" of the City. Banford 
served her Notice of Claim upon Dean Storey, City Finance 
Director. The City argues that service on this individual 
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cannot be deemed service on the "governing body" of the 
political subdivision. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 provides that a claim against 
a political subdivision is barred unless notice of claim "is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the claim arises. . . . " Decisions of 
this Court and Utah statutes support that, under the 
circumstances of this case, Banford has satisfied the notice 
of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13. Utah Code 
Ann. §68-3-2 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The rule of the common law that statutes 
in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the 
statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of the state 
respecting the subjects to which they 
relate, and their provisions and all 
proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice. 
Nowhere in the Governmental Immunity Act is the term 
"governing body" of a political subdivision defined. The 
City attempts to use a definition of "governing body" set 
forth in the Utah Municipal Code, Utah Code Ann. §10-1-101 et 
seq. Utah Code Ann. §10-1-104, however, makes it clear that 
the definition of "governing body" is limited to "as used in 
this act". Nowhere in the Utah Municipal Code or in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act has the legislature stated that the 
definition of "governing body" in the Utah Municipal Act is 
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applied when construing the term "governing body" as it 
applies to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Certainly, 1 
the legislature had intended for that definition to apply, 1 
could easily have said so. The legislature could just as 
easily have defined "governing body" in the Governmental 
Immunity Act itself. The legislature has not done that. In 
that regard, this case is most similar to the decision of 
this Court in Brittain v. State of Utah, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
In Brittain, the plaintiff pursued claims against the 
Utah Department of Employment Security and the Utah Division 
of Facilities, Construction, and Management. Brittain filed 
notices of claim under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 with the 
Attorney General and the Division of Risk Management. The 
State filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Brittain 
had failed to file a notice of claim with either the 
Department of Employment Security or the Division of 
Facilities, Construction, and Management, as required by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. The statute provides that a 
notice of claim be filed with the Attorney General and "the 
agency concerned". Addressing that issue, this Court stated 
Because the term "agency concerned" is 
not clear on its face, we uill interpret 
the notice requirement of section 63-30-
12 m a manner consistent with the 
overall purpose of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. As explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court lf[i]t is necessary to 
consider the policy of the notice 
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requirement so that in any particular 
case the facts can be evaluated to 
determine if the intent of the statute 
has been accomplished." Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1980) . 
The primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible 
public authorities an opportunity to 
pursue a proper and timely investigation 
of the merits of a claim and to arrive 
at a timely settlement, if appropriate, 
thereby avoiding the expenditure of 
public revenue for costly and 
unnecessary litigation." (Citations 
omitted). 
Id. at 668. 
Like the term "governing body", the term "agency 
concerned" in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 is not defined in the 
statute. This Court turned to the commonly understood 
dictionary meaning, "interested" and concluded that the 
statutory notice of claim requirement was met by filing 
notice "with any one of potentially several agencies with a 
legitimate interest in plaintiff's claim and the legal 
proceedings which might result therefrom." I_d. at 668. 
In an important final paragraph, in language directly 
applicable to the facts of this case on appeal, this Court 
concluded: 
Finally, we wish to reiterate that this 
is not a case where the notice of claim 
was defective in form or content. 
Recognizing the need for written notice 
to protect against the unreliability of 
memory, the notice of claim was 
preserved in writing, accurately 
recording Brittain's account of the 
16 
accident. This is also not a case where 
plaintiff either gave no notice or filed 
only one of two required notices . 
Finally, this is not a case where notice 
of claim was not filed within the one-
year period. It is undisputed that 
plaintiff sent both notices well within 
one year from the date his claim arose. 
Id. at 669 
While there are some factual differences between this 
case and the Brittam case, the reasoning of that case 
controls these facts. 
The major difference between this case and the Brittam 
case is that this case involves a claim against a political 
subdivision, as opposed to a claim against the State. The 
language of the Act requires that when pursuing a claim 
against a political subdivision, the notice of claim is to be 
filed "with the governing body of the political subdivision." 
As mentioned before, the term "governing body" is not defined 
in the Act. Common dictionary meaning of the word "govern" 
includes the terms "administer", "direct", "control", and 
"manage". Websters New World Dictionary, Second College 
Edition, p.604 (1979). 
Just as a corporation can only act through individuals, 
service upon any "governing body" must be made upon an 
individual. In this case, service was made on Dean Storey, 
the City Finance Director. Certainly, service upon this 
individual and the city he claimed he represented constitutes 
service on those with power to administer, direct, control, 
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and manage the interests of the City and, specifically, with 
regard to this personal injury claim. In a letter dated July 
25, 1995, to Banford's then attorney Mr. Sondgeroth, Mr. 
Storey states in the closing line "Please contact me as the 
city representative." 
It is clear from that correspondence that Mr. Storey 
had been assigned responsibility for this claim by the City 
and was acting as their authorized agent. Banford was 
instructed to direct all correspondence to Mr. Storey, as 
agent for the political subdivisions. 
The facts and circumstances of Banford's service of the 
Notice of Claim, coupled with the reasoning of this Court in 
Brittam, make it clear that Banford's Notice of Claim 
service satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
13. The trial court's denial of the Cityfs Motion to Dismiss 
on December 17, 1997 should be reinstated and its granting of 
the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling on Motion 
to Dismiss should be overruled. 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT BANFORD'S NOVEMBER 16, 
1995 CORRESPONDENCE CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF CLAIM, 
THE COMPLAINT WAS THEN FILED TIMELY AS REQUIRED BY 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. Banford's complaint was timely filed under U.C.A. 
68-3-7 and rule 6 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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The statutes the defendant/appellee claim are 
dispositive as to the issue of whether the complaint was 
timely filed, are U.C.A. 63-30-14 and 63-30-15. Pu-suant to 
§ 63-30-14, 
[w]ithm ninety days of the filing of a claim 
the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or 
denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been 
denied if at the end of the ninety-day period 
the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier has failed to approve or deny the 
claim. 
and U.C.A. 63-30-15 (2), 
[t]he claimant shall begin the action within 
one year after denial of the claim or within 
one year after the denial period specified in 
this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmenta1. 
The appellee here argues that if this court finds that 
the letter of November 16, 1995 is m compliance with the 
notice of claim to the city of Kaysville, the appellee 
failed to deny the claim within the ninety days as required 
by U.C.A. 63-30-14, therefore requiring the appellants to 
file their complaint by February 13, 1997. Although ninety 
days from the November 16, 1995 letter is February 13, 1996, 
the appellant argues that U.C.A. 63-30-14 must be read in 
conjuntion with U.C.A. 68-3-7 along with rule 6 (e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to U.C.A. 68-3-7, 
[t]he time in which any act provided by law 
is to be done is computed by excluding the 
first day and including the last, unless the 
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last is a holiday, and then it is also 
excluded. 
Under rule 6 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
[w]henever a party has the right or is 
required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after 
the service of a notice or other paper upon 
him and the notice or paper is served upon 
him by mail, three (3) days shall be added to 
the prescribed period. 
Since the November 16, 1995 letter was mailed to the 
City of Kaysville Finance Director, the city of Kaysville 
was provided with an additional three days from the ninety-
day date in which to deny the claim, under rule 6(e) of the 
Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the letter was mailed 
on November 16, 1995, the ninety day period of denial would 
lapse on February 14, 1996, under U.C.A. 68-3-7, but the 
appellee would be given an additional three days within 
which to make its denial under URCP 6(e), extending the date 
to February 17, 1996. Thus, commencing the one-year period 
under U.C.A. 63-30-15 on February 17, 1996 and requiring 
that the complaint be filed on or before February 17, 1997. 
Rule 6 (e) URCP is not a discretionary rule but 
mandates that three (3) days shall be added to a prescribed 
period. In Utah Chiropractic Associations Inc. v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the United States, 579 P.2d 1327 
(Utah 1978), the court ruled that a party had one (1) month 
and three (3) days from the date an order was mailed in 
which to file a Petition for Review of the Insurance 
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Commissioner's decision. The court cited rule 6 (e) word 
for word and thereafter added three (3) days time for the 
appellate filing. In Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1978) 
the court followed the decision in Utah Chiropractic 
Associations, Inc. and ruled that the under URCP 6 (e), 
three days would be added to the time in which the litigant 
would be required to act when the Commission's decision was 
served by mail. (See also, Mickleson v. Shelly, 542 P.2d 
740 where the court stated "our rules of civil procedure 
provide that when notice is required and is given by 
mailing, three (3) extra days must be included in the 
required time.")(Emphasis added) 
Finally in Disciplinary Action of McCune, 717 P.2D 701, 
708 (Utah 1986) the court disallowed a claim by McCune that 
he had not received proper notice as this mailing time was 
not added to the notice of hearing. However, the court 
stated, "however, McCune did not object at the time of the 
hearing to the notice he received. He thereby waived his 
right to object, especially since he has shown no prejudice 
resulting from a shortened time period." 
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
the rules " . . . shall be liberally construed to serve the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action." Relying upon McCune, appellants have not waived 
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the additional three (3) days mailing period to the ninety 
(90) day period required for an answer from the defendants. 
By denying the appellants this time would cause prejudice 
and a great inequity against the appellants, allowing 
party's to use Rule 6 (e) as a discretionary double edged 
sword, accepted and rejected at their whim. As shown in 
this case, Rule 6 (e) could be used to extend the ninety day 
rule by allowing the city of Kaysville to argue they had an 
additional three days to deny the claim or, as better served 
to justify their position, choose not to add an additional 
three days and argue untimely filing. In any sense, the 
reasoning behind the purpose of Rule 6 (e) , to avoid 
confusion in the litigation process, would be circumvented. 
Rule 6 (e) is not in conflict with 63-30-14, and is a rules 
standard all attorneys must be able to rely upon to create 
order amid the chaos of litigation. This court should rule 
that Rule 6 (e) had extended the appellees ninety-day denial 
date by three additional days making the date of denial 
February 17, 1996. 
Since February 17, 1997 was a state and federal 
holiday, and the complaint was filed by the appellants on 
February 18, 1997, they had timely filed within the 
statutory time period. 
B. Banford's complaint was timely filed even if the 
court finds that Rule 6(e) is inapplicable to this 
case. 
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The appellees argue and the lower court's decision was 
based upon U.C.A. 63-37-1, stating: 
[a]ny report, claim, tax return, statement or 
other document or any payment required or 
authorized to be filed or made to the state 
of Utah, or to any political subdivision 
thereof, which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States 
Mail, shall be deemed filed or made and 
received by the state or political 
subdivisions on the sate shown by the post-
office cancellation mark stamped upon the 
envelope or other appropriate wrapper 
containing it. 
and U.C.A. 63-30-15 (2), which states in part, "[t]he 
claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial 
of the claim or within one year after the denial period 
specified in this chapter has expired . . ." (Emphasis 
added) Pursuant to these statutes, the appellees argue, and 
the lower court held, that U.C.A. 63-37-1 was the applicable 
statute governing the date of filing the letter of November 
16, 1995. The Notice of Claim was deemed to be filed on 
November 16, 1995, requiring the appellants to file their 
complaint within ninety days and one year, or February 13, 
1997. 
To refute this argument, the appellants submitted 
affidavits from appellants' originally retained attorney, 
Kenneth L. Sondgeroth and Regina Acevedo, the secretary for 
the law office of Kenneth L. Sondgeroth. These affidavits 
were provided as evidence of Mr. Sondgeroth's office mailing 
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procedure. Pursuant to office procedure, the mail was 
picked up and delivered to his office in between the hours 
of 9:00 am and 10:00 am every day. Mr. Sondgeroth's 
affidavit also explained his practice for the typing and 
signing of letters to be mailed. Since Mr. Songeroth's mail 
was picked up in the morning, any letters dated for a 
specific day were signed by him at the end of each day and 
mailed the following morning. Ms. Acevedo's affidavit also 
explained the regular office procedure for mailing letters. 
In appellee's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter Findings or Amend 
Judgment, they cite to Lister v. Utah Valley Community 
College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1994) to strike the 
affidavits of Mr. Sondgeroth and Ms. Acevado. In Lister, 
the plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging failure to 
serve the notice of claim upon the Attorney General as 
mandated by U.C.A. s 63-30-12 and filed an affidavit of the 
Lead secretary of the Litigation Division of the Utah 
Attorney Generals Office which established that no notice of 
claim had been served upon the Attorney General. The 
plaintiff responded by filing an affidavit from his attorney 
in which claimed that it was his standard office practice to 
mail notices of claims to the Attorney General's Office. He 
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provided no specific evidence that this notice was ever 
mailed to the Attorney General's office. 
The appellees argument is that these affidavits 
established only office routmr as to review the letter at 
the end of the day and place it in the outgoing mail box, 
which was then picked up m e following morning. Under 
Lister, the appellees argue tne affidavits are not competent 
because neither Sondgeroth nor his secretary testified that 
they had personal knowledge of the exact time they placed 
the letter in the mail. The appellees argue t hat it is 
just as likely that the letter could have been dictated and 
signed the day before or the morning and mailed in the 
morning pickup on the 16th. 
Lister is distinguishable form the underlying facts in 
this appeal. In Lister, the Litigation Division of the Utah 
Attorney General's office, the office that maintains and 
controls all notices of claim received by the office, 
claimed that no notice of claim was ever received on behalf 
of Lister by the Utah Attorney General's office. The 
affidavits were than provided to prove that the notice of 
claim was actually mailed. The court in striking the 
affidavits, cited Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 stating " [ I ] n 
this case, there is no evidence concerning the postmark or 
the date of mailing. There is nothing from counsel or his 
secretary that state that a notice was in fact filed." Id. 
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at 935. Unlike in Lister, the appellant's notice of claim 
was in fact mailed and received by the Kaysville City 
Finance Director, Dean Storey. The affidavits were not 
provided to prove that the notice of claim was ever mailed, 
they are provided to prove the time of mailing. Therefore 
they are competent evidence of Sondgeroth's office mailing 
policy and should not have been stricken by the lower court. 
If the court finds that the notice of claim letter 
dated November 16, 1995, was deemed filed on November 17, 
1995, and that the appellees had until February 14, 1996 
within which to deny the appellants claim (90 days after the 
mailing of the notice) , the one year period provided for in 
§63-30-15 does not begin to run until February 15, 1996. 
Accordingly, the appellants then had until February 15, 1997 
within which to file their complaint. Since February 15, 
1997 was a Saturday, and February 17, 1997 was a state and 
federal holiday, the time within which the appellants had to 
file their complaint was extended until Tuesday, February 
18, 1997, when the complaint was, in fact, filed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants complied with the applicable sections of the 
Utah Code by making and maintaining numerous contacts with 
official representatives of the Appellee. The Appellants in 
fact, timely filed a Notice of Claim. 
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The Appellants complied with the applicable sections of 
the Utah Code by timely filing their complaint, within one 
year from the date that any denial of their claim could be 
implied under the statute. 
DATED this 2*t~s day of December, 1998. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITI 
December, 1998, to the following counsel of record: 
>y certity tnat AFFULLANT'S M^MUKANUUM ut 
'IES was hand-delivered this day of 
Harry Souval 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Newhouse Building 
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 ST § 68-3-2, Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed--Rules of equity 
evail 
tah Code § 68-3-2 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 68. STATUTES 
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
58-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed—Rules of equity prevail 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes of 
is state The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they reiate, and their provisions and all 
Dceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice 
henever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same matter the rules 
equity shall prevail 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
3-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee—Time for filing notice. 
laim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of 
jloyee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
erning body of the political subdivision according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim 
3r before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function 
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
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r ST § 63-30-14, Claim for injury--Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance 
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tah Code § 63-30-14 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
63-30-14. Claim for injury-Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within ninety day 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
aimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period 
ie governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
> enacted by Chapter 139, Laws of Utah 1965 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is pro ided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
1-15. Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for filing action against governmental entity 
[f the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the governmental entity or an 
se of the entity. 
The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period 
d in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
nental. 
tended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987 
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tah Code § 63-37-1 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 37. MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS, RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS TO STATE OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
63-37-1. When postmark date deemed filing date—When mailing date deemed filing date 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to the 
ate of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be deemed filed or made and received by the state or political 
lbdivisions on the date shown by the post-office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper 
Dntaining it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is illegible, 
rroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender establishes by 
ompetent evidence that the report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or payment was deposited in the United State 
mil on or before the date for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any such report, tax return, statement, or othei 
ocument required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after 
written notification is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such report, tax return, 
tatement, or other document. 
s enacted by Chapter 179, Laws of Utah 1967 
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§ 68-3-7, Time, how computed 
ode § 68-3-7 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 68. STATUTES 
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
7. Time, how computed 
time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless 
is a holiday, and then it also is excluded. 
his disc for cases citing this section. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 10-1-104 
rffigtory: C. 1953, 10-1-102, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act" — See § 10-1-101 
U77, ch. 48, § 1. and notes thereto. 
10-1-103. Construction. 
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be liberally construed 
flopennit the municipality to exercise the powers granted by this act except in 
£ases clearly contrary to the intent of the law. 
History: C. 1953, 10-1-103, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act." — See § 10-1-101 
J977, ch. 48, § 1. and notes thereto 
10-1-104. Definitions. 
S\s used in this act: 
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class, city 
of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah, but 
unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include 
counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments. 
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the 
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the 
city commission; 
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city council; 
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council. 
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class 
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities. 
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in Section 10-2-301. 
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to 
town clerks. 
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah 
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipal-
ity unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law. 
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of 
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street, alley, 
public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or other 
public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality, by some 
other political subdivision of the state or by the state. 
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity 
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service 
delivery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed 
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity. 
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded 
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by 
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn 
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorpo-
rated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total 
aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
# (10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by 
incorporated area of one or more municipalities. 
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving more 
than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per 
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Rule 6 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 
Service by mail, additional time after, 
U.R.C.P. 6(e). 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.R 14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Filed depositions. 
Service upon attorney. 
—Presumption of authorization. 
When service required. 
—Default judgment. 
Appeal. 
Cited. 
Filed depositions. 
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court 
are presumptively public under the Utah Pub-
lic and Private Wntings Act (former § 78-26-1 
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be 
kept secret only on a showing of good cause. 
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P2d 
1095 (Utah 1990). 
Service upon attorney. 
—Presumption of authorization. 
Where defendant engaged attorney only to 
file motion but never so notified court or attor-
ney, appearance of attorney to file motion 
raised presumption that he represented defen-
dant in full action. Where defendant presented 
no clear and convincing evidence to refute pre-
sumption, notice given to attorney of date set 
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v. 
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966). 
When service required. 
—Default judgment. 
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-
dants of default judgment entered against 
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 
P2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985 
addition of reference to Rule 55). 
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the default 
judgment to defendants did not invalidate the 
default judgment when defendants received the 
notice of default in time to move to set aside the 
judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Appeal 
Under former Rule 73(h), time for appeal 
from default judgment in city court runs from 
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather 
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. 
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,288 P.2d 
786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d). 
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. 0*Neil, 4 
Utah 2d 270, 293 P2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury 
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7 
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 R2d 581 
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 R2d 806 
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores, 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 R2d 944 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at place of abode," or similar terms referring to 
Law § 6; 61AAm. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to 
352. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15; 
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413. 
A-LJL — Construction of phrase "usual 
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes 
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
Service of process by mail in international 
civil action as permissible under Hague Con-
vention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241. 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
19 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated m them 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the 
continued existence or expiration of a term of court The continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court m no way affects the power of a court to do any act 
or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it 
(d) For motions —Affidavits A written motion, other than one which may be 
heard ex parte, and notice of the heanng thereof shall be served not later than 
5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is 
fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the court Such an order may 
for cause shown be made on ex parte application When a motion is supported 
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion, and, except as 
otherwise provided m Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the heanng, unless the court permits them to be served at 
some other time 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or 
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997 ) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment inserted "by CJA 4-501" in the first sen-
tence of Subdivision (d) 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a), (b), 
(d) and (e) of this rule are substantially similar 
to Rule 6 F R C P 
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision (b), 
was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 
Cross References. — Amendment to plead-
ings to conform to evidence, time of motion for, 
U R O P 15(b) 
Commencement of action, time of service, 
U R C P 4(b) 
Corporation or association, mailing of process 
to, U R.C P 4(e)(5) 
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu 
lanties, U R C P 32(c) 
Discharge of attachment or release of prop-
erty, U R C P 64C(f) 
Documents for state or subdivision, filing 
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3 
Election laws, weekends and holidays in-
cluded in computation of time, § 20A-1-401 
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge 
proceeding not affected, § 78-7 21 
Juvenile Court Act, time computed according 
to Rules of Cml Procedure § 78-3a-27 
Legal hohdavs enumerated § 63-13-2 
New trial, time of motion for after judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, U R C P 50(c)(2) 
Order defined U R C P 7(b)(2) 
Pleadings and other papers service by mail, 
U R C P 5(b)(1) 
Probate Code, mailing of notice of hearing, 
§ 75-1-401 
Reference to master time of first meeting of 
parties after, U R C P 53(d)(1) 
Relief from judgment or order, time for mo-
tion, U R C P 60 
Rules by district courts, U R C P 83 
Service by mail, U R C P 5(b)(1) 
Substitution of parties, time of motion for, 
U R C P 25 
Summons mailed as alternative to personal 
service, U R C P 4(g) 
Time, how computed, § 68-3-7 
Tribunal, board or office exceeding jurisdic-
tion, notice, U R C P 65B(e) 
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely 
filing, U R C P 12(k) 
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional time after service by mail 
—Administrative procedure 
— Failure to add days 
Waiver of objection 
—Industrial Commission 
Computation 
—Months and years 
Enlargement 
—Motion for new trial 
— Notice of appeal 
Designation of record 
—Redemption from execution sales 
Motions and affidavits 
—Applicability of rule 
Court orders 
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Part X. District Courts and Clerks 
Rule 
77 District courts and clerks. 
78 to 80 Repealed 
Part XI. General Provis ions 
81 Applicability of rules in general 
82 Jurisdiction and venue unaffected. 
Rule 
83 Repealed 
84 Forms 
85 Title 
Appendix Of Forms 
Index to Rules 
PART I. SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the 
state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether 
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except 
as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the 
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. 
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also 
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the 
opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the 
rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event 
the former procedure applies. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment substituted "the courts" for a list of 
courts, by level, near the beginning of Subdivi-
sion (a) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F R C P , 
except that it has been adapted to procedure of 
this state 
Cross Refe rences . — Children's cases 
deemed civil proceedings, § 78-3a-44. 
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected 
by rules, U.R C.P 82. 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district 
courts, circuit courts, and justice courts, Title 
78, Chapters 2, 2a, 3, 4, 5 
Supreme Court rulemaking, § 78-2-4 
United States, execution of process on land 
acquired by, §§ 63-8-1, 63-8-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability 
—Administrative body 
Federal rules 
Noncompliance 
Cited 
Applicability. 
—Administrative body. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply to a proceeding before an administrative 
body seeking to regulate activities burdened 
with a public interest Entre Nous Club v 
Tbronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P2d 670 (1955) 
Federal rules. 
Since these rules were fashioned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it is proper to 
examine decisions under the federal rules to 
determine the meanings thereof Winegar v 
Shm Olson, Inc , 122 Utah 487, 252 P2d 205 
(1953) (construing Rule 41) 
Noncompl iance . 
Noncompliance with rules is allowed only 
when some inadvertence, surprise, excusable 
neglect, or mistake has occurred, and deviation 
is required for substantial justice to be done 
Holton v Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P2d 438 
(1952) 
Cited in Howard v Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 
356 P2d 275 (1960), State v Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 
345, 359 P 2 d 12 (1961), State ex rel Road 
Comm'n v Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P2d 914 
(1966), Ellis v Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189 ,429P2d 
39 (1967), Bartholomew v Bartholomew, 548 
P2d 238 (Utah 1976), Dixon v Stoddard, 765 
P2d 879 (Utah 1988). 
